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he savings and loan debâcle - the soaring
number of insolvencies of financial institu-
tions - has been a traumatic event for the
United States. During the “roaring eighties,”
a lot of changes affected the U.S. financial landscape.
The rising interest rates in the early 1980s led to a sig-
nificant flow of consumers dollar into mutual funds.
The competition for the savings dollar became very
fierce among financial institutions. This pressure com-
bined with regulatory mistakes (see White [1991]) had
a perverse consequence on many financial institutions.
They reached for riskier assets offering higher yields
and operated with less capital per dollar of assets. In
that respect, the example of life insurance companies
is very informative. Life insurance were forced to
redesign their product lines and to migrate toward
interest rate sensitive products (see Wright [1991]).
This new environment induced life company invest-
ment officers to mismatch assets and liabilities and to
lower quality standards by assuming higher credit
risks. The result was, as we know now, disastrous. In
1987, nineteen companies went bankrupt; in 1989, a
worrisome forty; in 1991, a new record of fifty-eight
insolvent insurance companies. Canada went through
the same kind of turmoil. In 1992, only a year after
CompCorp, an industry-financed guarantee corpora-
tion, the insurance company, Les Coopérants, failed. It
was followed by the collapse of Sovereign Life in
1993. In 1994, Confederation Life went into receiver-
ship.
Europe has not been spared by these costly
events, either. Although less publicity has been given
to the distresses of the major European insurance com-
panies, concern is growing among European regula-
“How did a boring, straight-forward business become
so interesting and so difficult to regulate?”
Salvatore R. Curiale
Superintendent of Insurance
New York State Insurance Department
tors and consumers. According to a recent article
published in The Economist (July 17, 1993), insurance
companies in the United Kingdom have started to cut
bonuses on “with profits” policies. Most Scandinavian
companies have been severely down graded.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to a
better understanding of the driving forces of a life
insurance company. More specifically, the issues of
the duration and convexity of insurance liabilities and
equity are addressed. As noted earlier, these issues
deserve a careful rethinking given the recent trends
that have affected the insurance landscape. A correct
assessment of these risk measures is critical as they
constitute the primary ingredients of any sound asset-
liability management approach. In addition, the effort
toward a more detailed and more accurate risk picture
of life insurance operations enables one to debunk
some pitfalls that are commonly encountered in the
insurance industry, as shown in the next section.
DEBUNKING  SOME COMMON  PITFALLS
IN LIFE INSURANCE
Most life insurers claim that their industry car-
ries distinguishing features which makes it quite
unique. In particular, they often reject the comparison
with the banking industry by arguing that banks and
life insurance companies are significantly different
animals. To support their claim, life insurers usually
put forward three basic arguments. These arguments,
as the story goes, are sufficient motives for their indus-
try to deserve a specific asset-liability management
treatment.
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property-casualty insurers, underlines the fact that the
insurance production process is inverted: output prices
(read insurance premiums) have to be established
before input prices and costs (read claims) are known.
The insured pays a known insurance premium and
may incur in the future some damage which will be
then reimbursed. This situation, according to insurers,
is at odds with, say industry, where costs or input
prices are known beforehand and used to set prices.
The second argument stressed by insurers is
somehow a corollary of the first one. According to this
argument, risk-taking initially occurs on the liability
side of the balance sheet. Underwriters issue insurance
policies which are transformed into liabilities (read
technical reserves). Because of the time lag between
the premium inflow and the indemnity outflow, the
reserves are invested on the financial marketplace and
generate the portfolio of assets of the company. Again,
this is at odds with the banking industry which,
according to insurers, initially take risks on the asset
side (read loans, mortgages etc...).
Before turning to the third argument, the first
and the second argument can be shown to be quite
dubious. They are easily debunked. Indeed, the first
argument is rather astonishing when the insurance
contract is framed into an option setting. An insurance
contract is a put option: like the equity put option, its
primary function is to provide his holder with an asset
value guarantee. The writer of any option has to fix a
premium before he knows whether or not the option is
going to be exercised. Bankers are familiar with
options: they embed prepayment options in mortgages
(which is a way of insuring the borrower against inter-
est rate risk) without knowing whether or not the bor-
rower is going to use them. Bankers, option markets
players do not however complain about a so-called
inverted production process!
The second argument is also quite easy to dis-
mantle. Bank deposits can be viewed as providing
liquidity insurance. A depositholder knows that, in
case of unexpected liquidity needs, he can totally or
partially cash out his deposit. The analogy with insur-
ance is even stronger: because of the law of large num-
bers, not everybody is expected to run and require
from his bank his total deposit back. The notion of risk
mutualization is precisely at the heart of the insurance
industry. To make the counterargument even more
convincing, the case of indexed CDs issued by banks
can be referred to. Banks offer deposits whose return
is composed of a fixed component and a variable com-
ponent pegged to some index. By issuing such depos-
its banks are indeed taking risks: they guarantee a floor
and add up a potential bonus.
The third argument is by far the most compel-
ling one. Life insurers frequently insist upon the long
maturity of their liabilities. This long term view stems
from the actuarial dimension of insurance liabilities. A
typical example is the life annuity which is paid until
death which may occur very late. Until recently, as
stressed by Wright [1991], “portfolio philosophy in the
life insurance business was centered on the matching
of assets and liabilities... The traditional practices of
buying long-term bonds and mortgages and holding
them to maturity were based on the long duration of
liabilities”. Wright hastens to add that today “a
rethinking of the duration of these (insurance) prod-
ucts is essential”. This rethinking is not only urged by
the redesign of life insurance policies but also by the
pressure of competition. Insurance agents bring con-
siderable pressure on companies headquarters to set
initial rates high enough to match competition and
keep them high in the future even though interest rates
might have fallen down. These interwoven effects
challenge the long view of insurance liabilities. The
duration, in other words the interest rate risk exposure
of insurance liabilities, is not only a matter of mortal-
ity tables and proper discounting but is also signifi-
cantly affected by the “geometry” of the contractual
liabilities cash-flows. Because insurance liabilities are
not traded and accounting practices tend to distort the
cash-flow picture, this last point is not clearly under-
stood. A lot of insurance companies still manage their
liabilities using a long term horizon while they should
be shooting at a much shorter time frame. The out-
come of such practices is clear: an outsized mismatch
between the durations of assets and liabilities jeopar-
dize the value of equity when interest rates increase.
MODELLING  STAKEHOLDERS  CASH-FLOWS
In the previous section, three common pitfalls
have been debunked using rather qualitative argu-
ments. The purpose of the current section is to set up a
simple quantitative model of a life insurance company.
Indeed, the use of fairly standard financial tools such
as options, duration and convexity measures yields a
more accurate, not to say a more convincing, risk pic-
ture of life insurance liabilities. More specifically, the
outputs of this simple quantitative model reinforce the
views expressed in the previous section by giving
some order of magnitude.
Our model is based on Merton’s approach to
financial intermediaries [1977, 1990]. Only one type
of life insurance policy is considered here. The closest
example of such a policy on the US life insurance mar-
ket is the Universal Life insurance contract (UL) that
was introduced in 1979. The cash value of a UL con-
tract typically earns a minimum guaranteed rate of
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insurance accumulations to the portfolio rate of return
earned by the insurer. Some other US life insurers
leave it to the Board of Directors to determine the rate
credited on the UL contract. It is however fairly clear
that this decision cannot really depart from the perfor-
mance of the insurer’s portfolio. It also corresponds to
the UK “with profits” policies. These British policies
insure customers for a lowish basic sum, which is then
topped up with discretionary bonuses (the profits),
depending on how the insurer’s investments perform.
This type of policy is also quite common in France.
The first component of the rate to be served on these
French policies is fixed and guaranteed. However, reg-
ulation imposes a profit-sharing mechanism. Indeed,
by law, French life insurance companies have to pay
policyholders at least 85 percent of their net financial
revenues - namely, dividends, coupons, rents, realized
capital gains, and so on. This profit-sharing mecha-
nism is known in France under the name of Participa-
tion aux Bénéfices. To sum up, policyholders benefit
from a guaranteed interest rate and a percentage of the
performance of the company’s asset portfolio. As a
result, two key inputs characterize such policies - the
guaranteed interest rate and the participation level.
The model enables one to determine the fair interest
rate or the fair participation level policyholders should
require to fully compensate them for the risks they
face.
1 In other words, the model yields the fair price of
the insurance liabilities given the current structure of
the company balance sheet.
2 Based on this valuation,
interest rate risk measures can be computed. These
computations show, as already pointed out in the first
section, that conventional wisdom needs to be “turned
upside down.”
A life insurance company whose planning hori-
zon extends over a given time interval [0, T] is con-
sidered. Time  t = T can be considered as the time to
maturity of a single cohort of life insurance policies
issued at time t = 0. Insurance and financial markets
are assumed to be competitive. At time  t = 0, the
premiums of the life insurance cohort. The life insur-
ance policy is structured as follows. The policyholder
is guaranteed a fixed interest rate  r
*. On top of this
the net financial revenues (dividends, net capital gains,
coupons, rents...) of the life insurance company. This
below by regulation. In France, for instance, it cannot
go below 85 percent. The guaranteed rate r
* is usually
less than the market rate for a risk-free asset of the
same maturity as the policy. The participation coeffi-
between the two rates and embodying the required risk
premium by policyholders holding risky life insurance
policies. Indeed, shareholders have a limited liability,
and if the company is declared insolvent at time
t = T, they simply walk away.
At time t = 0, the company’s balance sheet is
given by Table 1. For the sake of simplicity, we nor-
The portfolio of assets is assumed to be totally
invested in risky assets (equity, bonds, real estate).
The first risk element of the balance sheet is
interest rate risk. To capture the uncertainty in the term
structure of interest rates, we use the Heath, Jarrow
and Morton [1992] process
3. The second element of
risk is asset risk - that is, all risk affecting assets other
than interest rate risk
4. To give a complete picture of
the riskiness of the insurance company, the portfolio
of assets is assumed to be affected by both the interest
rate risk and the asset risk. As a result, the value of the
as of time t, is governed by a
stochastic process whose path is affected both at the
same time by asset risk and interest-rate risks.
5
Under this simple setting and using the contrac-
tual definition of stakeholders’ cash-flows, one can
write the policyholders payoffs as follows. Three
states of nature have to be clearly distinguished.
l
.
In the first scenario (the worst case scenario), the
insurance company is totally insolvent : the value
of assets as of time T is less than the guaranteed
payment to policyholders. The company is
declared bankrupt, and the policyholders receive
what is left:
L T = AT (1)
In the second case, the insurance company is able
to fulfill its guaranteed commitment but unable to
serve the bonus. Assuming that the policyholders
assets are earmarked, we define BT, the financial
bonus to policyholders once guaranteed payments
have been cashed out as of time t = T:
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. In the third scenario, BT is positive. Assets gener-
ate enough value to match the guaranteed pay-
ment and the policyholders bonus. In such a case
the liabilities as of time T are equal to :
(2)
To sum up, the first case corresponds to a case
of total insolvency; the second case is a partial insol-
vency in the sense that only guaranteed commitments
are fulfilled; the third case is the best case scenario
where the insurance company is performing well.
Because of the limited liability feature of
equity, the shareholders’ stake is a residual stake. Their
final payoffs ET are depicted across the three previous
scenarios:
Ž  First case :
Ž Second case:
Ž  Third case:
These payoffs suggest that equity and liabilities
have the features of contingent claims. This result is
obviously not a surprise. Indeed, since the seminal
works of Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton
[1973], it is well-known that the limited liability
equity of a levered firm can be valued as a contingent
claim on the firm’s underlying assets. The only differ-
ence here is that the contractual structure is more
involved and includes features that are not present in
the simplified picture à la Black-Scholes-Merton.
VALUING  EQUITY AND  INSURANCE  LIABILITIES
By applying the option pricing framework (see
Briys and de Varenne [1994]), the market value of
both equity and insurance liabilities can be computed.
As far as equity is concerned, Table 2 indicates that
the value of equity as of time T is given by :
The two terms on the right hand side
ing but the final payoffs on two call options
are noth-
maturing
equity at any time t < T can thus be rewritten as:
(4)
both European calls
6 maturing at time  (T–t)  and
The equity of the life insurance company is an
hybrid entity. The first term on the right hand side is
this first term is the familiar limited liability call
option (see Black and Scholes [1973] and Mer-
ton [1973]). Shareholders have the option to walk away
if things go wrong. The second term appears because
of the potential bonus. This term is also a call option.
A bonus is equivalent for the policyholders to having a
call option on the performance of the insurance com-
pany assets. Equity is thus made of a long (limited lia-
bility) call position and a short call position, the latter
As far as liabilities are concerned, the final
cash-flows depicted in Table 2 indicate that they can
be priced as follows:
shareholders’ put to default - that is to walk away from
their guaranteed commitments.
7 The intuition underly-
ing the pricing of insurance liabilities is obvious.
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three basic components as shown in Table 3. The first
term values the insurance liabilities of a default-free
no-bonus insurance company. The second term
reflects the fact that the insurance company may
default: policyholders write an option to default to
shareholders. The third term is related to the bonus
which the company may pay if it does well.
Policyholders have two ways to be rewarded
for the risk of non performance they face. For a given
they do get a fair rate of return on their policy. Or, for
a given r
*, they will make sure that the bonus level is
such that the insurance policy offers an ex-ante fair
rate of return. Viewed from the shareholders’ side, the
pricing of the insurance policy should be such that
they are fairly compensated for owning the stock of
the insurance company. This in turn means that the
guaranteed rate and the bonus should be such that the
initial cash outlay by shareholders is equal to the
present value of their claim on future equity cash-
flows. The present value of this claim is already
known: it is given by expression (4). To put it even
more simply, shareholders will not “subsidize” policy-
holders, nor will policyholders “subsidize” sharehold-
ers. For a given guaranteed rate  r
*, the matching
bonus can be computed. For a given bonus level, the
guaranteed rate is obtained. It is worthwhile to observe
that while r
* cannot be computed explicitly, an ana-
lytical expression for the bonus can be derived:
(6)
The model can thus be used to draw some pric-
ing implications. In particular, the relationships link-
ing the pricing parameters to the various inputs
(volatility, leverage, etc...) can be thoroughly exam-
ined (see Briys and de Varenne [1994] for more
details). The objective of the current paper is not so
much in terms of pricing but primarily in terms of risk
assessment. Indeed, the knowledge of the valuation of
insurance liabilities as given in expression (5) is most
helpful: the interest rate sensitivity of these liabilities
can be directly measured by simply computing the
derivative of expression (5) with respect to the short-
term interest rate
8. In the same vein convexity mea-
sures (second-order derivative) can be established.
MEASURING THE  DURATION OF  INSURANCE
LIABILITIES
As indicated in the previous section our valua-
tion model has interesting implications for assessing
the riskiness of a life insurance company. Indeed, the
assets and liabilities of a life insurance company are
interest rate sensitive. To implement a sound Asset-
Liability Management (ALM) approach, the insurance
manager needs to accurately evaluate his risk expo-
sure. Interest rate elasticity, duration and convexity
measures are now commonplace. Nevertheless, most
of them are quite restrictive and only apply under a
specific set of assumptions. Corporate default, bonus
schemes are for instance rarely taken into account.
This is unfortunate and produces biased estimates of
the true elasticity of insurance liabilities. In that
respect, our model corrects these pitfalls.
After some computations,
9 the following
expression for the duration of insurance liabilities
obtain as of time t :
(7)
From expression (7) several polar cases can be
recovered. The first one deals with the situation where
there is no bonus and the volatility of assets is nil.
Under these assumptions, the duration of insurance
liabilities is exactly equal to maturity. This makes
sense because insurance liabilities become just a
default-free zero-coupon bond.
In the second case, no bonus is attached to the
insurance policy. Assets are, however, risky. As a
result, expression (7) collapses to:
(8)
A careful inspection of expression (8) is illumi-
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plex expression (7). Indeed, expression (8) is basically
composed of three terms which can be disentangled as
follows. As already mentioned above, the first term
corresponds to the time to maturity  (T  – t) of a
default free zero-coupon bond. The second term G, is
equivalent to the interest rate elasticity gap between
the insurance company’s assets and the default-flee
zero-coupon bond. This is so because the ratio
insurance firm’s assets. The third term in (8) can be
viewed as a probability adjusted leverage ratio.
Expression (7) is obviously more complex than
expression (8). It reflects not only the above men-
tioned effects but also the influence of the bonus
scheme. For policyholders, this bonus is equivalent to
a long position on a call option whose duration affects
the total duration of the insurance policy.
greater than Macaulay duration. This result may seem
quite counterintuitive. This lengthening of the effec-
tive duration finds its main roots in the bonus scheme
and the interest rate elasticity gap between the insur-
ance company’s assets and the default-free zero-cou-
pon bond. In the case of a negative correlation
10
(which we have here) and short maturities the gap is
the total impact on the effective duration is a positive
one. The risk of life insurance liabilities is a more
complex issue than conventional wisdom suggests. As
recalled in section 2, life insurers frequently insist
upon the long maturity (read duration) of their liabili-
ties. The message conveyed by our contingent-claim
approach is somewhat different and boils down to
11:
“short means long, long means short”!
A last point concerning Table 4 deserves some
explanation. When the maturity of the life insurance
liability is zero, it appears that the effective duration is
not nil. In Table 4, it is roughly equal to three. Such a
result is strongly at odds with what intuition would
suggest. However, a careful investigation of expres-
sion (7) gives the clue to the puzzle. The effective
duration of insurance liabilities is driven by the dura-
tion of assets through the bonus mechanism. When the
bonus is nil, intuition is recovered: effective duration
is equal to zero. Again, the message conveyed by our
model is clear; “real short means quite long!”
To confirm the qualitative arguments put for-
ward in section 2, we now turn to a numerical imple-
mentation of our duration model. Table 4 depicts the
relationship between the duration of insurance liabili-
ties and the maturity of the life insurance policy. It is
based on the following basic parameters values:
= 0.1. In Table 4, the 45° line rep-
resents the locus of points where duration is exactly
equal to maturity. Several comments are in order. One
can first observe that the effective duration of insur-
ance liabilities is generally smaller than the maturity,
i.e. the Macaulay duration. Insurance liabilities are
composed of three terms. The default put reduces the
duration of insurance liabilities, so does the long posi-
tion on the bonus call option. Indeed, the call is an
increasing function of the interest rate. For instance,
life insurance liabilities with a maturity of 20 years
have an effective duration of 6.1 years. But this result
does not carry over to short term insurance liabilities.
For maturity below 4 years, the effective duration is
Table 4 yields interesting results. One could
however argue that it does not clearly disentangle the
respective effects of the shareholders’ option to default
and the bonus scheme. To cope with this, some more
numerical simulations are implemented. More specifi-
cally, in Table 5, a life insurance liability with a matu-
rity of ten years is considered. In this table, the
effective duration of the insurance liability is related to
the insurance company leverage ratio. For low lever-
age ratios
12, the effect of the put to default is signifi-
cantly neutralized. The bulk of the impact on the
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stems primarily from the bonus scheme. Indeed, in the
comer case where the leverage ratio is close to zero,
the effective duration of the insurance policy with a
typical bonus of 85% is roughly 55% of that of an
insurance policy with no bonus at all.
SOME  lMPLICATIONS FOR  EQUITY  IMMUNIZATION
A relevant objective of any asset-liability man-
agement policy is to ensure that equity is insensitive to
unexpected shifts in interest rates. Indeed, sharehold-
ers do not need a cumbersome vehicle such as a life
insurance company to bet on the future course of inter-
est rates. They can do it themselves by buying or sell-
ing bonds or interest rate futures contracts !
In what follows we look at the implications of
our previous results for the asset-liability posture of
the life insurance company. The market value of
equity is obviously equal to the difference between the
market value of assets and the market value of liabili-
ties. As such, its duration is directly affected by both
the duration of assets, the duration of liabilities and the
leverage effect. Table 6 portrays the behavior of equity
value as a function of the level of the interest rate.
To draw such a picture, expression (4) is used.
In that equation, the change in asset value in response
to the change in interest rates is approximated by using
the asset duration and the asset convexity.
13 The corre-
lation coefficient is set such that the equity duration)
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is equal to zero for a 10% interest rate. The striking
feature in Table 6 is that equity behaves like a short
straddle. In options markets, short straddle are
achieved by simultaneously selling a put and a call on
the same underlying asset. The rationale for choosing
such a profile is betting on small movements in the
price of the underlying asset whatever the direction. In
such a case, the options are not exercised by the long
side and the short straddler is ensured to retain the
option premiums. In case of large movements, this
short straddling position is obviously a very risky one.
From Table 6 and its set of parameters, one can
observe that the duration of equity is nil at a 10% inter-
est rate. If rates go below that level, the slope becomes
positive: when rates decrease, equity goes down.
Beyond that level, the slope is negative: when rates
increase, the value of equity decreases. The fact that
the equity of a life insurance company may resemble a
short straddle is not new. It has been described by
Babbel and Stricker [1989]. Babbel and Stricker’s
framework however is quite different and their short
straddling equity is a direct result of their choices for
assets and liabilities. In their model insureds hold a
surrender option, namely the equivalent of an Ameri-
can put option on a zero-coupon bond. On the asset
side, the company, in its quest for extra yields, is
assumed to invest in callable bonds. By buying such
bonds, the insurance company implicitly sells an
American call bond option to the issuer. The short
straddle outcome is then quite straightforward : the
insurance company ends up selling options not only on
the liability side but also on the asset side. In our set-
ting, this explanation is not valid. For instance, no
option is assumed to be sold on the asset side. No sur-
render option is considered. The only options at work
are the put to default and the bonus call option. Both of
them are on the liability side. The concavity of equity
(“negative gamma” to use an option pricing terminol-
ogy) is the by-product of the interest rate risk exposure
of assets and liabilities and the leverage effect. As a
result, even in a very simple framework, the insurance
company may turn out to “bet the bank on interest
rates”. To clarify why a short straddle is obtained, it is
useful to disentangle the various effects at play on the
asset side and the liability side.
Table 7 depicts these various effects by relating
the relative change in assets, liabilities and equity val-
ues to the level of the interest rate. Given the choice of
(reasonable) parameters, liabilities and assets are
shown to exhibit a classical convex behavior. The con-
vexity effect is however stronger on the liability side
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to go up because of the negative correlation: the total
effect on the bonus call option is a positive one. Liabil-
ities increase more than they would in the absence of a
bonus. When rates go up, assets tend to decrease: the
dominant effect is that of the put to default which goes
deeper into the money. Liabilities lose more value than
they would if no default were possible. As a result, lia-
bilities turn out to be more convex than assets. The
consequence for equity is immediate. Equity exhibits a
negative convexity. In Table 7, equity is interest rate
risk immune at a 10% interest rate. Any change from
that level entails a destruction of shareholder value.
To avoid such a prospect, that is gambling on
interest rates on behalf of shareholders, assets must be
allocated such that their duration results in a zero-
duration for equity. To show that this is possible,
equity duration is related to asset duration in Table 8.
Because the interest rate elasticity of assets is given by
by tuning the correlation coefficient for a given level
of asset volatility. Indeed, a lower coefficient means
that the asset portfolio is more heavily invested in
bonds. On the contrary, a higher coefficient implies
that the portfolio is geared toward equity investment.
In Table 8, an asset duration of 4.1 years, namely a
coefficient equal to -0.204, yields a zero equity dura-
tion. A greater asset duration would imply a company
betting on a decrease in interest rates.
A last implication of our results is that deriva-
tives like options or structured products are certainly
nice candidates for fine-tuning equity immunization
strategies. Indeed, to compensate negative convexity
effects, buying options (i.e. buying positive convexity)
on the asset side is a decision that deserves careful
consideration.
C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a life insur-
ance liabilities valuation model which debunks some
pitfalls commonly encountered in the insurance indus-
try. Using a contingent claim based methodology, a
fairly simple closed-form solution for the pricing of
life insurance liabilities is obtained. Because it
accounts for stochastic interest rates, default risk and
bonus schemes, this model produces more accurate
duration and convexity measures. The effective dura-
tion of life insurance liabilities has been shown to be
significantly different from the traditional Macaulay
duration measure. For reasonable sets of parameters,
equity has been shown to resemble a short straddle
even though we did not rely on the traditional explana-
tions to achieve such a result. Immunization implica-
tions have also been considered.
Some additional work can usefully complement
these results. Extensions to more complex life insur-
ance policies is a natural candidate. Indeed, surrender
options have not been taken into account. Because
they amount to selling options to policyholders, intro-
ducing them would amplify our picture. Liabilities
would be even more sensitive to increases in interest
rates.
References
Babbel, D., and Stricker, R., 1989, Asset/Liability Management for
Insurers, Insurance Perspectives, Goldman Sachs
Black F. and Scholes, M., 1973, The pricing of options and corpo-
rate liabilities, Journal of Political Economy, 84, 637-659
Briys, E. and de Varenne, F., 1994, Life insurance in a contingent
claim framework : pricing and regulatory implications, The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 19:53-72
Heath, D., Jarrow, R. and Morton, A., 1992, Bond pricing and the
term structure of interest rates : a new methodology for contin-
gent claims valuation, Econometrica,  60(1), 77-105
Merton, R. C., 1973, Thery of rational option pricing, Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science, 4, 141-183
Merton, R. C., 1977, An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit
insurance and loan guarantees, Journal of Banking and
Finance, 1, 3-11
Merton, R. C., 1990, Continuous Time Finance, Cambridge : Basil
Blackwell
Wright. K. M., 1991. The structure conduct and regulation of the life
insurance industry, in R.W. Kopcke and R.E. Randall (Eds.),
The Financial Condition and Regulation of Insurance Compa-
nies, Boston : Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
On the risk of life insurance liabilities: debunking some common pitfalls 8Footnotes
1. For a detailed analysis of these pricing issues and some regulatory
implications, the interested reader is invited to refer to Briys and
de Varenne [1994].
2. We do not consider the mortality issue. Indeed, introducing a
mortality table would not change our results.
3. Under this representation, the price dynamics of a default-free
zero-coupon maturing at time T is given by:
taneous risk-free rate at time t and Wt  a standard Wiener pro-
cess. Other representations could have been used. The important
point here is that interest rates are stochastic.
4. That is, all risk affecting assets (equity, real estate...) other than
the interest rate risk.
5. More precisely, the stochastic process is given by
denote respectively the instantaneous expected return on assets
and their instantaneous volatility. Zt  is a standard Wiener process
independent of Wt  capturing the asset risk other than the interest
rate risk. The coefficient p represents the correlation between the
total value of assets and the interest rate.
6. See Appendix for the detailed formula.
7. See Appendix
8. The term structure model that we use here is a one factor model.
Extensions can obviously be made to multi-factor model. In that
case, multiple durations (with respect to each factor) can be com-
puted.
9. Detailed computations are available from the authors upon
request.
10. This assumption is obviously a reasonable one.
11. Under our set of assumptions.
12. Reasonable interest rate and asset volatility levels are also
retained.
14. The equity duration is defined along the same lines as equation
where :
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